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Joined 2 years ago
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Cake day: June 15th, 2023

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  • Not that it’s my first recommendation for security reasons, and I would never do this in prod, but you can just add the self-signed cert to the local trusted root CA store and it should work fine. No reg changes needed.

    If you do this, put it in the store of the user running the client, not LocalMachine. Then you just need to make sure you connect as something in the cert’s SAN list. An IP might work (don’t know since I never try to put IPs in the SAN list), but just use a hosts entry if you can’t modify local DNS.

    Edit: after reading the full OP post (sorry), I don’t think it’s necessarily the self-signed cert. If the browser is connecting with https:// and presenting a basic auth prompt, then https is working. It almost sounds like there is a 301/302 redirect back to http after login. Check the Network tab of the browser’s dev pane (F12) to see what is going on.


  • Microsoft uses TPM PCRs 7+11 for BitLocker which is more secure than the Linux implementations mentioned in the article.

    PCR 7 is the Secure Boot measurement which means it can’t be unlocked unless every signed boot component has not been tampered with up to the point of unlock by the EFI bootloader. PCR 11 is simply flipped from a 0 to a 1 by the bootloader to protect the keys from being extracted in user land from an already booted system.

    The article is correct that most Linux implementations blindly following these kinds of “guides” are not secure. Without additional PCRs, specifically 8 and 9 measuring the grub commands (no single-user bypass) and initrd (which is usually on an unencrypted partition), it is trivial to bypass. But the downside of using these additional PCRs is that you need to manually unlock with a LUKS2 password and reseal the keys in TPM whenever the kernel and or initrd updates.

    Of course to be really secure, you want to require a PIN in addition to TPM to unlock the disk under any OS. But Microsoft’s TPM-only implementation is fairly secure with only a few advanced vulnerabilities such as LogoFAIL and cold boot attacks.














  • Look man, this is just exhausting. I’m well aware of that security policy. I have enabled it at some of my clients. But it’s not a default setting and would never be on a random non-enterprise PC. This is what I mean when I say the only people who are getting locked out this way were screwing with their computers in ways they don’t understand, installing random garbage and following bad advice on the internet.

    From your link:

    If you set the value to 0, or leave blank, the computer or device will never be locked as a result of this policy setting.